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Abstract: 
A set of US-based companies is investigated regarding the effectiveness of intellectual property 
protection mechanisms (IPPMs) in the formation of research partnerships. Patents are the most 
frequently used IPPM to protect both background and foreground knowledge in partnerships. 
Other IPPMs are used to protect know-how, especially in the early, forming stages of a 
partnership. Existing IP titles are quite useful when negotiating new partnerships. IPR 
negotiations are reported to be more complex in horizontal partnerships and when universities 
are involved. 
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1. Introduction 
Research partnerships involving firms, universities and, less often, government agencies have 
grown in numbers and in importance in most industrial nations. This nearly two-decade old 
phenomenon is the result of a number of factors including, but not limited to, the complexity and 
speed of technical advance and the globalisation of the world economy. Public policy has shifted 
over this period, especially in the United States, from discouraging such relationships on antitrust 
grounds, to encouraging new research joint ventures (RJVs) by modifying antitrust regulations.1 
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have adopted specific 
guidelines for companies to receive limited indemnification should antitrust issues arise during 
partnership activities.2 
Research partnerships are complex organisational arrangements. They take many forms ranging 
from infrastructures to support the informal sharing of information among partners to the 
creation of entirely new research entities. Some include large numbers of firms joining together 
to set industry standards. Others are truly one-on-one research ventures with specific 
technological goals. Still others are specific product-focused partnerships with either customers 
or suppliers aimed at solving a particular problem and thereby generating more business with just 
one other firm. 
 
Intellectual property protection mechanisms (IPPMs) – such as patents, copyrights, trademarks 
and trade secrets – are considered to be critically important to research partnerships because 
sharing of information is key not only to the initial formation of the research partnership, but also 
to its ability to complete successfully the designed research. Extant economics and business 
literature anticipates that the use of IPPMs in research partnerships depends on many factors 
relating to the type of knowledge to be protected, the kind of competition in the specific industry, 
the organisational characteristics and culture of the owner of the knowledge as well as of its 
partners (e.g. competitors, suppliers/buyers, universities), the nature of the partnership, the 
objectives of the partnership and the position of the partnership in the continuum from the early 
planning stage to termination (Hertzfeld et al., 2001). 
 
Yet, there is a conspicuous absence of empirical analysis, beyond anecdotal information and case 
studies, about the use of different IPPMs in research partnerships, the role that these mechanisms 
are expected to have and the relative effectiveness of these mechanisms in protecting intellectual 
property in a research partnership context.3 Our exploratory research in this area was intended to 
begin to fill this conspicuous void, accounting for all aspects of intellectual property in formal 
collaborative R&D agreements. 
 
This paper presents a set of results from a multi-year, multi-faceted project on IPPMs. It 
describes findings from a sizeable set of firms that were investigated with regard to their 
assessment of the role and effectiveness of IPPMs used in the formation and execution of 
research partnerships. The samples of surveyed and interviewed firms include large, diversified 
US-based companies. 
 
All in all, our findings confirm the view that resolving issues of IP protection is a fundamental 
consideration for all partners. While there is strategic variation among firms regarding the way 
they approach the issue of IPRs in research partnerships, our evidence does not, however, 
indicate that this has been an issue presenting insurmountable problems for large, diversified 
companies. Patents are found to be the most frequently used IPPM to protect both firms’ existing 
technologies when entering into an RJV (background knowledge) and the technology created by 
the RJV (foreground knowledge). Other IPPMs, and especially trade secrets, are also used 
extensively to protect know-how and tacit knowledge, especially in the early, negotiating stages 
of a partnership. Existing IP titles – especially patents – are reportedly quite useful when 
negotiating new RJVs. Prior experience with the specific research partners facilitates the 
formation of a new collaborative R&D agreement. Finally, IPR negotiations are reportedly more 
complex in horizontal RJVs and when universities are involved. Almost without exception, the 
sampled companies expressed serious concerns in reference to their recent experience with 
universities, especially with regard to negotiating IPR agreements with university technology 
transfer offices. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 considers conceptual issues related 
to the protection of IP in research partnerships. Identification of these issues will lead to a better 
understanding of the complexity of IP-related activities associated with the organisation of 
research partnerships. The design of the study and the data collection process are described in 
Section 3. Section 4 discusses our survey and interview findings. Section 5 presents a summary 
of an exploratory econometric analysis of a portion of these data relating to the importance of 
patents in protecting background and foreground knowledge in partnerships. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper with summary remarks. 
 
2. Conceptual issues related to intellectual property and research partnerships 
Economic theory places intellectual property (i.e. knowledge) at the heart of its appraisal of 
collaborative R&D. Both transaction costs and mainstream industrial organisation theory 
consider the particular characteristics of technological knowledge – a latent public good whose 
creation and productive use are characterised by uncertainties – to be deterministic of both the 
incentives to form a research partnership and the economic impacts of such an association. 
 
The explanation of RJVs provided by transaction cost theory is straightforward. Joint ventures 
are considered hybrid forms of economic organisation (Williamson, 1996) that aim at 
economising on transaction costs. In the area of R&D specifically, these costs may be high due 
to asset specificity and spillovers resulting in incomplete contracts and the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour. Theory predicts that in order to circumvent opportunism, the more 
specific assets are and the more costly contracts are, the greater the incentive to integrate. 
Integration may, however, also entail costs in terms of rigidities, the more so the more valuable 
flexibility is in a particular industrial/technological set up. Theory thus concludes that 
intermediate forms of organisation – hybrid governance structures – will be efficient under such 
conditions (Menard, 1996). 
 
The basic message from industrial organisation theory with respect to cooperative R&D is also 
clear (Vonortas, 1997). The nature and magnitude of the impacts of collaboration in R&D will 
not be the same across the board, but are expected to vary with respect to market organisation, 
strategic motives and interaction between firms, and the process of technological accumulation 
in an industry. 
 
The workhorse model in this theory has been directed towards studying the incentives for and 
impacts of cooperative R&D. This model has assumed a two-stage game in which firms choose 
levels of innovative activity in the first stage and compete in the product market in the second. 
Innovative activity is measured in terms of R&D dollars. A firm's (call it firm 1's) first-stage 
objective is to incur the optimum R&D expenditure to maximise profits from its output choices 
in the second-stage game. The first-stage objective can be written as 
equation (1) 
 
where q is the vector of outputs, x the vector of R&D expenditures of the firms in the 
industry, C is the unit cost and the subscript 1 corresponds to the firm in question. Importantly, in 
such models it is assumed that ∂C1/∂x1 < 0 and ∂C1/∂xj ≤ 0 (j ≠ 1); that is, the innovation 
expenditures of a firm always lower its own marginal cost of production and may lower the cost 
of its rivals. In other words, intellectual property protection is not complete and spillovers may 
exist. 
A standard result of these models is that, in a non-cooperative situation, private investment in the 
imperfectly appropriate R&D is likely to be sub optimal. The equilibrium solution can often be 
brought closer to the social optimum by allowing firms to collaborate in R&D. Assuming that 
firms collaborate in the first stage in a research partnership, but compete in the second stage of 
the game, we can express the partnership objective as being to maximise all partners’ 
profits, Π, with respect to the collaborative R&D expenditure, X: 
equation (2) 
 
 The chances for the cooperative R&D set up to result in higher rates of innovation and higher 
profits than the non-cooperative set up tend to increase with the degree of knowledge spillovers, 
ceteris paribus. 
While the extent of knowledge spillovers seems, however, to be an important determinant of the 
willingness to cooperate, the ceteris paribus assumption may be a strong one to make. Benefits to 
partnership members will depend on their willingness to exchange information. This, in turn, will 
be affected by several factors, most importantly the nature of the R&D (e.g. substitutive, 
complementary). Some models indicate that firms prefer to collaborate in complementary R&D 
(e.g. vertical cooperation, suppliers–buyers), while others show private benefits in substitutive 
R&D (e.g. horizontal cooperation). The latter is primarily the case when the establishment of 
standards is an objective of collaboration. Overall, information is expected to be exchanged to a 
larger extent if partners are not direct competitors. 
Extensions of atemporal models like the one above have added to imperfect appropriability other 
important features of innovation such as the idea of cumulative R&D. In these models, firms 
start with a stock of (background) technological knowledge and every time period they add to 
that stock through both their own R&D expenditures and the R&D expenditures of their 
competitors (Joshi and Vonortas, 1997). For example, consider an industry with two 
firms, i and j, and discrete time, t = 1, 2, … There are two stages in each time period as above. In 
stage 1, the set  of R&D expenditures of the two firms is determined. R&D expenditures, 
via some production function, increase the stock of technological knowledge available in 
period t, . These stocks of knowledge, in turn, determine the unit cost of production for 
each firm in period t, , where  is the t-period output of firm i. Given an initial stock 
of knowledge  in period 0 and a spillover rate 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, technological knowledge is assumed 
to evolve according to 
equation (3) 
 
That is, technological knowledge in period t is composed of the technological knowledge 
accumulated in the previous t − 1 periods and the increment to this stock of knowledge in 
period t, through the R&D expenditures of both firms. Again, the idea is to examine under what 
conditions cooperative R&D improves on non-cooperative equilibria in terms of social welfare. 
Firms maximise profits similar to expressions (1) and (2) above which are then compared. 
Cooperation can accommodate different types of research partnerships. At the one extreme, it 
can involve joint decision-making for R&D investment but separate execution and no further 
communication of results between partnership members beyond existing market spillovers. At 
the other, it can involve both joint decision-making and joint R&D undertaking with full 
communication of results between partnership members. Many other possibilities – with 
incomplete communication of results – lie in between. 
The strategic management literature also places IP at the core of its argument for R&D 
cooperation. The analytical focus here has been on the conditions that facilitate effective 
resource deployment and learning to accommodate innovation in environments of technological 
complexity and high market and technological uncertainty. Research partnerships have been 
considered as a vehicle to shape competition and implement strategic change. The coordination 
and sharing of the value chain with partners, the joint creation of value, the accumulation and 
reconfiguration of resources, the development of new resources, the building of new capabilities 
and core competencies and organisational learning in partnerships have attracted most attention 
from management analysts. 
 
The legal literature views IPRs issues in research partnering to revolve around adequate 
arrangements between the collaborating parties that safeguard their private intellectual property 
while maximising the benefit of joint research. The means for sharing the results of such research 
ex post also raise important considerations. When partnerships involve government funding, the 
question arises of how to price and whether to restrict access to third parties. Cross-border 
research partnerships add a dimension of creating the correct procedures for sharing and 
protecting the intellectual property from international joint research. The problems here result 
from the lack of harmonisation across national IPRs systems. National patent systems differ, 
sometimes extensively, and such differences can be a source of legal uncertainty and friction 
between partners. 
 
Partners often enter into an RJV possessing valuable and multiple types of knowledge (i.e. 
intellectual property), part of which is contributed to the research effort. This knowledge may be 
shared among the partners (and with third parties on occasion) for the term of the partnership 
and, in some instances, even after partnership termination. Similarly, the likely product of a 
successful research partnership is technology, which may qualify for protection by one or more 
IPPMs (Karalis, 1992). 
 
Furthermore, IPRs “facilitate the very formation of the [joint] venture itself, because they codify 
discrete quanta of technology that the partners license into the venture, making it easier to keep 
track of which partner contributed the technology” (Merges, 1995, p. 1570). IPRs also allow the 
partners to manage the output of the alliance. IPRs represent important assets that the partners 
must allocate if and when they wind up the alliance. IPRs provide evidence of the work of the 
partnership and this also saves time and energy because partners need not, at the time of 
dissolution, specify in detail all the research results produced by the venture. IPRs also “organise 
relations” between the venture and its parents by providing a discrete asset that the venture can 
license or assign (Merges, 1995). Perhaps most important, IPRs define the limits of the 
partnership's rights with respect to its technologies. In the absence of IPRs, the partners would 
need much more detailed contracts specifying technology rights. 
 
IPPMs involved in research partnering are likely to take at least one of four forms: patent, 
copyright, trademark or trade secret protection. Each type of IPPM has specific requirements that 
must be met before protection will vest, and each suggests important considerations for firms 
contemplating the formation of a partnership. 
 
IP licensing arrangements among partners, and between the partners and the alliance, may raise 
concerns under the antitrust laws about horizontal collusion by competitors and potential 
competitors. The horizontal combination of firms and the acquisition of one firm by another is, 
in the United States, controlled by section 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 7 prohibits a firm from 
acquiring the assets of another when the effect “may be to substantially lessen competition, or 
tend to create a monopoly … in any line of commerce.” If two firms become fully or 
substantially integrated, there is a ‘merger’ for the purposes of the Clayton Act, even if the 
integration is labelled a joint venture.4 Thus, section 7 is broadly applied to regulate the 
formation of joint ventures as well. The analysis of a merger under section 7 is complex. First, 
the court will define the relevant product and geographic markets involved in and affected by the 
merger and then will determine the post-merger level of market concentration using the 
horizontal merger guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission.5 
 
Until the early 1980s, many firms were reluctant to enter research partnerships because they 
were uncertain as to how the alliance would be treated by the courts if challenged. As a 
consequence, the Department of Justice issued its Antitrust Guide Concerning Joint Research 
Ventures in 1980.6 The Guide stated that the rule of reason would be applied to enforcement 
regarding RJVs and encouraged joint venture activity in markets where “foreign (or any other) 
competition was eroding market power of the partners, making old technology obsolete, or 
otherwise necessitating large-scale joint efforts to develop new or improved technology.” 
According to the Guide, these factors would be considered in assessing the competitive effects of 
the RJV. 
 
Although the Guide stimulated some activity, it was largely ineffective in encouraging many 
firms contemplating the formation of a RJV (Friedman, 1992 and Sennett and Dyhrkopp, 1998). 
In 1984, however, Congress enacted the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) in order to 
ensure that the Clayton Act did not deter firms from entering into research and development joint 
ventures. In 1993, the Act was amended to include production joint ventures as well and is now 
referred to as the National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA). The NCRA and 
the NCRPA specify that RJVs are not per se illegal, but that they should be evaluated by the rule 
of reason standard, “tak[ing] into account all relevant factors affecting competition, including, 
but not limited to, effects on competition in properly defined, relevant research, development, 
product, process, and service markets.” Use of the rule of reason analysis to test joint ventures is 
based on the inherent assumption that innovation is more likely to flourish through competition 
than through collective endeavour (Einhorn, 1999). For instance, a partner in a joint venture may 
be reluctant to pursue a line of research that could jeopardise its technology investments, or the 
joint venture might lead to ancillary restraints such as a patent pool. NCRA and NCRPA said 
that RJVs can disclose their research intentions to the Department of Justice and, by so doing, the 
members of the RJV receive certain benefits if their research actions are challenged under 
antitrust law. In particular, such voluntary disclosure guarantees that even if found to fail a rule-
of-reason analysis – found guilty for attempting to monopolise a market, for example – they are 
subject to actual rather than the standard treble damages under US law. 
 
Generally speaking, RJVs raise fewer anticompetitive concerns than other types of joint venture 
because RJVs are far removed from the product production and marketing stage (Link and 
Bauer, 1989 and Winslow, 1985). Single firms may under invest in R&D because it is often easy 
for competitors to use or misappropriate information and technology. Likewise, IPPMs can be 
‘leaky’ in the sense that firms may free ride by imitating or inventing around patented inventions 
or processes protected by trade secrets. Thus, rivals that may otherwise be reluctant to invest in 
R&D may do so if potential free riders join them in the investment. Including potential free 
riders as RJV partners may encourage socially desirable innovation that might not otherwise 
occur. The NCRPA recognises this, so that if it appears that no anticompetitive effects are likely, 
the Department of Justice will not challenge the RJV and any related IP licensing agreements. 
 
The role of IPRs in RJVs was more specifically addressed in the Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property, issued by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department 
of Justice in 1995. According to the Guidelines, an RJV involving IPRs is analysed using the 
following inquiries: 
 
• Which relevant market is affected? Usually, this will be the innovation market—the 
competition in research and development to create new or improved products or processes, as 
well as the close substitutes for research and development. 
• Does the joint venture restrict competition in the innovation market? The degree of market 
concentration and market shares of the firms will be considered. Does the joint venture unduly 
restrict competition in other markets by means of collateral restraints? IPR licensing agreement 
and restrictions may be such restraints. 
• If there are anticompetitive effects, are there any offsetting efficiency benefits? If the potential 
for combining IPRs and other assets in such a way that makes successful innovation more likely 
or faster, or with reductions in cost, these efficiency benefits may allow the RJV to form 
nonetheless. 
Furthermore, the guidelines suggest that in some instances, joint ventures need not have a 
significant sharing of risk to lead to an efficiency-inducing integration of economic activity. 
Evidence of a pro-competitive purpose and structure providing incentives for efficiency-
enhancing conduct by participants can also be important and will be considered.7 
Under the guidelines, therefore, partners may share information relating to the technology to be 
developed. A patent cross-licensing agreement can be used for the joint venture where pooling of 
patents is necessary to avoid blocking patents or is reasonably necessary to the research of the 
joint venture. If the joint venture will own the patent rights, market entry can be regulated by 
licensing agreements for a substantial period of exploitation if reasonable (Katsh, 1985). 
Antitrust concerns arise when joint venture partners reduce output of new information or the rate 
of use of existing information, or the rate of output in existing product markets (Winslow, 1985). 
 
Several other considerations are relevant (Katsh, 1985). Antitrust concerns may arise if the 
industry is concentrated and the patent pool members account for a substantial share of sales or 
output in the industry or there are high barriers to entry in the market. Exclusive grantbacks may 
be challenged if they extend unreasonably beyond the original patents. Where trade secrets are 
involved, non-competition and confidentiality agreements are enforceable if they are for a 
reasonable period, although, if the restrictions on competition in the products or services are 
unrelated to the joint venture, they will be considered unreasonable. Where the joint venture 
develops a new technology based on the IP contribution of partners and new technology 
generated by the joint venture, the partners may agree on a method for determining the royalty 
rate and terms of the licensing package, including field of use restrictions, as long as they are 
reasonable. 
 
All in all, the legal issues regarding IPRs in R&D cooperation are complex. Contracts are 
typically customised to the particular circumstances around the agreement relating to the 
partners, affected industry(ies), markets, technology and regulatory environment. 
 
3. Design of the study and data collection process 
The sampling goal of our study was to survey 250 firms that are known to have participated in at 
least one RJV as evidenced by their notification in a Federal Register filing. As discussed above, 
the NCRA created a registration process of voluntarily disclosed RJVs to the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Notices of all RJVs containing, among other things, 
the research intentions and a list of all RJV participants are published in the Federal Register. 
 
From 1 January 1985 through 31 December 2000, 830 RJV notices were published in the Federal 
Register.8 Our sample population was delimited to the 288 RJVs listed between 1 January 1995 
and 31 December 1998. The reason for excluding pre-1995 RJVs was the anticipation that it 
would be difficult now to identify knowledgeable contact individuals in the participating 
organisations. The reason for excluding RJVs filed in 1999 and 2000 was the expectation that 
sufficient time was needed before IPPM issues would be realised. These 288 RJVs represent 
2120 entities—firms, universities, or government agencies. 
 
Additional filters were imposed in order to arrive at a population sample of 250 firms. First, by 
the nature of the study, all RJVs where one member was a foreign firm or a government agency 
were deleted. This filter reduced the population of potential survey participants from 2120 to 
823. Second, all closely held (private) firms were removed since necessary supplementary data 
such as sales, investments and industry classification are frequently difficult to obtain in 
longitudinal form. This second filter reduced the population from 823 to 454 publicly traded US 
firms. From these, 250 representative firms were selected. The selection criteria in this third filter 
were based on firm size and industry: a priori, we view the selected sample of 250 firms as 
representative of all public firms involved in RJVs registered with the US Department of Justice 
during 1995–1998. 
 
The contact person in each firm was the general counsel or patent counsel. Each was contacted 
prior to sending the survey and during the pre-survey period 12 declined to participate. Of the 
238 surveys sent, 54 were returned yielding a response rate of 22.7%. Comparative statistics on 
the population sample of 250 firms and the 54 firms responding to the mail survey are shown in 
Table 1. On average, larger firms, as measured by sales, were more likely to respond to the 
survey. Firms in SIC 35 (industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment) and 
SIC 36 (electronic and other electrical equipment) responded more frequently; firms in SIC 37 
(transportation equipment) and SIC 60 (depository institutions) responded less frequently.9 
 
 
Table 1. Survey sample and population sample of firms 
Characteristics Survey sample (n = 54) Population sample (n = 250) 
Mean sales a ($M) $ 18402 $ 13845 
Median sales ($M) $ 4166 $ 2963 
SIC 28 13.0% 12.1% 
SIC 35 14.8% 19.7% 
SIC 36 14.8% 22.2% 
SIC 37 5.6% 7.1% 
SIC 38 11.1% 7.1% 
SIC 60 6.3% 8.0% 
SIC 80 9.1% 5.6% 
All other industries b 40.7% 18.2% 
SIC 28: chemicals and applied products; SIC 35: industrial and commercial machinery and 
computer equipment; SIC 36: electronic and other electrical equipment; SIC 37: transportation 
equipment; SIC 38: instruments and related products; SIC 40: railroad transportation; SIC 60: 
depository institutions; SIC 80: health services. 
a Sales data came from the CorpTech database. 
b No other industries were represented by more than 10 firms. 
In addition, in-depth telephone interviews were planned with each of the 54 firms in order to 
explore several new topics. Twenty-three general counsels were available to participate in this 
phase of the study; information gleaned from the interviews was used to assist in the 
interpretation of the quantitative survey information. 
 
4. Descriptive analysis of survey and interview findings 
A major finding from this study is the extensive variation across firms concerning their approach 
to IPRs protection issues related to their RJV activities. It was virtually impossible to detect a 
single dimension across which one could categorise the reported differences in approach. This 
was not totally unexpected, of course, as it has been strongly argued in the past that firm 
behaviour reflects both internal factors—management preferences, established company routines 
and external factors—technology characteristics, market structure, regulatory environment, 
government policy (Nelson, 1991). In addition, our sample of surveyed and interviewed firms 
was relatively small and biased toward large, diversified firms. One possible dimension, which 
has also been pointed out by earlier studies dealing with IPRs (Levin et al., 1987) is the broad 
industrial group at the two- or three-digit SIC level. 
 
On the whole, our findings support the emphasis of the existing literatures on the importance of 
IP in appraising cooperative R&D. Interestingly, however, the representatives of the large 
industrial firms interviewed in this study did not think that the success of RJV formation in the 
past has hinged on issues relating to IP protection. They tended to view IP as one of many issues 
that need to be negotiated and clearly resolved before the RJV began, but they did not generally 
describe such issues as being a ‘showstopper’.10 In their opinion, it had been dealt with 
satisfactorily with few exceptions.11 Ranking higher in importance are issues that go to the heart 
of creating profit-making opportunities for the firm, such as expected sales that will result from 
the RJV activity and managing people coming from different firms with different corporate 
cultures. 
 
Interviewees reported a number of different types of RJVs that their firms enter into based on 
their needs and expectations. Some of these involve very little research; rather, they are attempts 
to share information and set industry standards. These RJVs tend to incorporate several, if not 
all, of the major players in an industry, hence they are frequently listed with the Department of 
Justice so that firms can receive antitrust indemnification. Existing patents are often brought into 
this type of RJV so that the participants can share just enough information to accomplish their 
purpose. Tacit know-how is rarely communicated in this type of RJV, thus the need for 
additional secrecy measures is not acute. Electronics and communications technologies 
companies are often participants in standards-setting RJVs.12 
 
Firms frequently mentioned their involvement in vertical RJVs formed with customers and/or 
suppliers. In this instance, the goal is often to solve a specific technological problem related to 
identifiable products. The close business association between the firms and their different 
industrial focus facilitate the negotiation of IPPMs. Intellectual property remains important, but 
since the problem to be solved is usually very specific there is often limited danger of extensive 
IP disclosures. 
 
Fewer companies reported being involved in research partnerships with competitors (i.e. 
horizontal RJVs), with the exception of standards-setting RJVs. Horizontal RJVs, the typical 
focus of economic theory, were reported the most difficult to negotiate from an IPR perspective 
because they involve sharing critical research output with rivals. Following our expectations, the 
petroleum industry is one where horizontal RJVs have been used frequently to address 
environmental concerns. This, of course, is the textbook case of imperfectly appropriable R&D, 
of peripheral value (beyond compliance) to the companies involved but of high social value. 
 
Our survey indicated that, in the vast majority of circumstances, the in-house counsel is the 
individual primarily responsible for negotiating intellectual property rights in RJVs (Table 2). 
The legal offices of the surveyed large, diversified firms had up to 60 lawyers dealing with 
intellectual property. R&D personnel frequently have a key negotiation role too (Table 3). These 
results were confirmed by the phone interviews. 
Table 2. Who within in your company is primarily responsible for negotiating intellectual 
property rights issues in a research partnership (n = 54)? 
Responsible party Frequency (%) 
In-house counsel 69.8 
President of chief executive officer 3.8 
Chief technology officer 7.5 
R&D director 13.2 
Other a 5.7 
a Examples include researchers and outside counsel. 
Table 3. R&D personnel (frequently/infrequently/never) have a key role in negotiating 
intellectual property rights issues in a research partnership (n = 54)? 





Mixed views were expressed with regard to the use of ‘boiler plate’ IP protection clauses in 
contracts for collaborative R&D. Several firms reported that prior experience has resulted in 
standard forms that are used as a starting point for negotiations. They build on these more or less 
extensively – they customise to a larger or smaller extent – depending on the case. The case is 
usually defined by the nature of the technology, the nature of the partner and prior experience 
with the specific partner, and the nature of the partnership itself. We think that this is an issue for 
further investigation as the specific picture may be influenced by the composition of our sample. 
One wonders whether smaller firms, lacking an in-house staff of IP attorneys and with much 
smaller IP portfolios, would be able to customise their approach at the same rate. 
 
Information on the role and effectiveness of alternative IPPMs used in the formation and 
execution of research partnerships is summarised in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6. Patents are 
most frequently used by firms to protect existing technology (background knowledge) when 
entering into an RJV, followed by trade secrets, copyrights and trademarks (Table 4).13 
Table 4. IPPMs for background knowledge (n = 54) 
IPPM Frequency of use a 
 
 4 3 2 1 0 
Patents 38 9 3 4 0 
Copyrights 4 9 20 18 3 
Trademarks 4 3 15 25 7 
Trade secrets 13 24 7 5 5 
a 4: most frequently used; 1: least frequently used; 0: not used. 
Table 5. IPPMs for foreground knowledge: only firms as partners (n = 54) 
IPPM Frequency of use a 
 
 4 3 2 1 0 
Patents 41 5 3 5 0 
Copyrights 4 8 21 18 3 
Trademarks 1 3 11 28 11 
Trade secrets 11 27 8 2 6 
a 4: most frequently used; 1: least frequently used; 0: not used. 
Table 5. IPPMs for foreground knowledge: only firms as partners (n = 54) 
IPPM Frequency of use a 
 
 4 3 2 1 0 
Patents 41 5 3 5 0 
Copyrights 4 8 21 18 3 
Trademarks 1 3 11 28 11 
Trade secrets 11 27 8 2 6 
a 4: most frequently used; 1: least frequently used; 0: not used. 
However, one very important finding from the telephone interviews was that when entering into 
the discussions for a new RJV, firms most often employ a confidentiality agreement, a non-
disclosure agreement, or a non-compete agreement or all of the above. Since discussions in the 
context of the RJV may be formal or informal and since the personnel involved may have a 
sizeable amount of know-how and tacit knowledge, the firm can best protect its IP by binding its 
employees to strict non-disclosure rules. Patents are explicit knowledge and constitute a major 
asset brought to the negotiations, but the knowledge is public and the IP problems revolve 
around how to structure the sharing of the use of the patented knowledge.14 
 
The use of existing IP titles for negotiating RJVs cannot be underestimated. Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001) have also underlined the use of patents as bargaining chips and a means of avoiding hold-
up problems in recent years; our communications with industry representatives showed a similar 
trend, although no systematic data were collected in this regard. 
 
Patents are also the IPPM most frequently used by firms to protect technology developed in a 
research partnership only with other firms (Table 5) or when universities are also involved 
(Table 6). Table 5 and Table 6 are visually very similar, but that similarity – when a 
university(ies) is present and not – is important to emphasise. As with background knowledge, 
one also notices the high incidence of ‘trade secrets’. It must be stressed here that non-disclosure 
agreements were omitted as an option in the questionnaires. Although a few companies wrote 
them in under ‘other’, the high significance given to trade secrets may have acted as a proxy 
substitute for this category of protection. 
 
Intellectual property protection is easier and faster to negotiate when previous negotiations have 
taken place between the parties to a prospective collaborative agreement (Table 7). 
Table 7. When my company has previously been involved in a collaborative research venture 
with the same party(ies), IPPMs are easier and faster to successfully negotiate with the same 
parties (n = 54) 
Response Frequency (%) 
7 (strongly agree) 18.5 
6 27.8 
5 24.1 
4 (neutral) 3.7 
3 5.6 
2 5.6 
1 (strongly disagree) 11.1 
0 (no opinion) 3.7 
 
To explore the relative difficulties of negotiating IPPMs, the general counsel in each firm was 
asked to respond to the following statements: 
 
(a) Intellectual property rights negotiations are more complicated when another firm(s) in the 
same industry(ies) as my company is involved in an RJV with my company. 
(b) Intellectual property rights negotiations are more complicated when a university(ies) is 
involved in an RJV with my company.15 
(c) Intellectual property rights negotiations are more complicated when a foreign-based 
firm(s) is involved in an RJV with my company. 
Respondents were instructed to use as a basis for comparison an RJV involving firms in a 
vertically related industry. The responses in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 clearly indicate that 
negotiations are more complex when other firms in the same industry(ies) or universities are 
involved in the venture. As shown in Table 8, two-thirds of the general counsels agreed with this 
proposition. An almost similar percentage (63%) agreed that university involvement increased 
the complexity of negotiations (Table 9). 
Table 8. Intellectual property rights negotiations are more complicated when another firm(s) in 
the same industry(ies) as my company is involved in an RJV with my company (n = 54) 
Response Frequency (%) 
7 (strongly agree) 22.2 
6 27.8 
5 16.7 
4 (neutral) 11.1 
3 9.3 
2 7.4 
1 (strongly disagree) 0.0 
0 (no opinion) 5.6 
 
Table 9. Intellectual property rights negotiations are more complicated when a university(ies) is 
involved in an RJV with my company (n = 54) 
Response Frequency (%) 
7 (strongly agree) 24.1 
6 18.5 
5 20.4 
4 (neutral) 16.7 
3 13.0 
2 0.0 
1 (strongly disagree) 0.0 
0 (no opinion) 7.4 
 
Table 10. University/industry relationships in RJVs 
Topic No. of 
companies 
citing problem 
Other adjectives used by respondents 
Universities harder to deal with now 5 Impossible, grim, outrageous demands 
 Universities don’t understand 
business 
6 Risk averse—put risk where it doesn’t fit. Less 
flexible than companies 
 Universities have become greedy 
 Want to own all IP 2 Assume invention is worth a lot of money 
 IP viewed as significant source of 
income 
7  
 Technology transfer office/officers are 
inexperienced 
8 Don’t know how to make a deal 
 Small staffs 6 File too many patent applications—waste money 
Frequent turn over of university TTO 
staff introduces discontinuities in 
negotiations 
3 Naïve. Take too long to get things done 
 Technology transfer office has little authority to commit the university 
 Statutory restrictions 4 State government/universities 
 Lack of flexibility 2  
 Find ways to work around technology transfer office and university administration 
 Professors/researchers easier to deal 
with individually 
6 Professors/researchers interested in performing the 
research. Use as a way to work-around technology 
transfer office. Sometimes set up separate company 
to do research 
 Publications 
 A problem but generally can find 
ways to work around it 
6 Usually publish with a delay—e.g. after patent 
application is filed 
 Other 
Topic No. of 
companies 
citing problem 
Other adjectives used by respondents 
 Use outside consulting firms to 
manage IP 
1 Experienced firms hired by university much easier 
to deal with than technology transfer office 
 Use for recruitment of new 
employees 
3  
 Create long-term strategic 
relationships with universities 
2 Umbrella agreements—one agreement to cover 
several scientists within the same university 
 
The establishment of an RJV with a university was reported to be the strongest and most deeply 
felt problem area for the surveyed companies in terms of IP protection. They all pointed to a 
growing trend in universities to be ‘more aggressive’ or ‘greedy’ in their negotiations with firms 
on IP issues for joint research ventures. Table 10 summarises key comments made by 
representatives of the 23 firms who were personally interviewed in this study on the specific 
topic. 
 
The consistency among the respondents was striking. Without exception, the companies found 
great difficulty in dealing with the university technology transfer offices and officers. Although 
they cite variations in the levels of competence in these offices, they find them generally 
inexperienced in their position, hard to negotiate with, lacking in business knowledge, mired in 
time-consuming functions and lacking in authority to make a final commitment for the 
university.16 At best, some companies were sympathetic where these offices and the technology 
transfer process in public universities were hindered by restrictive state statutes. 
 
Also consistent among respondents is the feeling of change over the past twenty years in dealing 
with universities. They describe the situation today in quite negative terms, focusing mainly on 
the universities’ seeming obsession with generating income from intellectual property. 
Companies describe the expectations of the universities as unrealistic, particularly in light of the 
fact that most IP does not have a high value and that the expense involved of taking an invention 
and making it into a successful commercial product falls to the firm. Universities, according to 
the firms interviewed, do not understand the business process well enough and demand 
ownership and income from IP generated in the university disproportionate to the contribution. 
 
The other striking and uniform position of industry is to try to work directly with research 
personnel in the university and to bypass the technology transfer office. They find working with 
researchers relatively easy and can often use the research staff to exert leverage on the university 
and intervene with the university administration to negotiate and generate an agreement 
satisfactory to the company. 
 
One company mentioned the relative ease of dealing with professional consulting firms and other 
organisations hired by the university to handle their IP in lieu of having an internal technology 
transfer office. These intermediary firms were found to have more expertise and understand the 
business process better than the universities themselves. 
 
A number of interviewed companies responded that they had faced far fewer problems with 
university agreements when using a strategy of developing long-term strategic partnerships with 
universities instead of negotiating specific research agreements. Such partnerships cover a 
multitude of situations and provide a flexible and predictable base for cooperation. Both 
universities and companies appear to be able to find more common ground for success in this 
fashion than with a one-time specific research venture. 
 
It is interesting that the right to openly and freely publish research results, a fiercely guarded 
principle of academic research, does not appear to be the key difficulty in the negotiations on 
research partnerships with universities. A compromise on this issue (usually in the form of a 
delay in publication until IP rights are secured) seems to be acceptable to researchers, 
universities and sponsoring companies. 
 
There was less agreement regarding the extent to which foreign firm involvement in an RJV 
increased the complexity of negotiations: about half of the respondents agreed with that 
proposition (Table 11). The supplementary information provided in the telephone interviews 
underscored that working with foreign firms on RJVs was more complex and difficult. The fact 
that virtually all interviewed companies are global in their outlook, however, meant that the 
existence of a foreign partner only resulted in a few more legal problems to solve. No company 
indicated that this was a barrier to entering into an RJV. They consistently found dealing with 
Europe easier than dealing with Pacific Rim nations on intellectual property issues. The most 
often stated problem area with foreign firms was agreeing on which nation's laws clause to apply 
in case of a dispute. 
 
Table 11. Intellectual property rights negotiations are more complicated when a foreign-based 
firm(s) is involved in an RJV with my company (n = 54) 
Response Frequency (%) 
7 (strongly agree) 9.3 
6 20.4 
5 22.2 
4 (neutral) 27.8 
3 14.8 
2 3.7 
1 (strongly disagree) 0.0 
0 (no opinion) 1.9 
 
Finally, telephone interviews found no consistency within companies as to how they handled the 
fees earned from the commercial exploitation of their intellectual property and from RJVs. In 
some cases the money went back to the research division or to the researchers as an incentive for 
additional R&D. In other cases it went directly into the company's general accounts. And, some 
companies have established separate profit-oriented technology transfer divisions that negotiate 
and market the IP for the whole company. These divisions are evaluated on the returns generated 
by the intellectual property commercialised outside the company. Most companies regard the 
legal support for IP and RJVs as part of their corporate overhead and do not charge the divisions 
directly for these services. 
5. Patent importance 
The survey findings in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 lend themselves to a more systematic, yet 
still exploratory, analysis. To investigate firm characteristics associated with patents being 
reported as the most frequently used IP mechanism to protect existing technology when entering 
an RJV (Table 4), we created a binary variable, PAT1, equal to 1 if the general counsel listed 
patents as the most frequently used IP mechanism to protect existing technology, and 0 
otherwise. A simple model to explore inter-firm differences in the relative importance of patents 
can be represented as equation (4) 
PAT1=f(RJVEXP, GENCOUN, Industry) 
RJVEXP represents the experience of each firm in research joint ventures as measured by the 
number of RJVs it was involved in between 1995 and 1998, inclusive. GENCOUN represents the 
general counsel's involvement in the negotiation of intellectual property rights issues as 
measured by the data in Table 2; GENCOUN equals 1 if the general counsel was the main 
responsible party for negotiating intellectual property rights issues, and 0 otherwise. To control 
for industry effects, the two-digit SIC characterising the firm's primary lines of business is 
included in the model. As shown in Table 1, over 50% of the firms in the survey sample are in 
four two-digit industries: SIC 28 measured as D28, SIC 35 measured as D35, SIC 36 measured 
as D36, and SIC 38 measured as D38. However, since only D38 enters the models significantly 
the other industry dummies are collapsed into the intercept for reporting purposes. 
The probit results in Table 12 indicate that prior firm experience in RJVs has a positive effect on 
the probability that the firm will rely on patents over other mechanisms to protect its background 
knowledge when entering into an RJV (column (2)). Reliance on patents is relatively higher for 
firms in SIC 38 (instruments). The term indicating the role of the general counsel in intellectual 
property negotiations (GENCOUN) enters positively (column (2)) but not significantly. 
Table 12. Determinants of the probability of patents being the most frequently used IPPM to 
protect existing technology probit estimates: dependent variable, PAT1 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept −0.117 (0.359) −0.394 (0.386) 
RJVEXP 0.009 (0.018) – 
ln(RJVEXP) – 0.366 (0.183)** 
GENCOUN 0.602 (0.422) 0.348 (0.446) 
D38 1.176 (0.613)* 1.173 (0.618)* 
 Log-likelihood −29.72 −27.75 
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.154 
Chi-square (3d.f.) 6.20 10.13 
N 54 54 
* Significant at 0.10 level. 
** Significant at 0.05 level. 
Similarly, Table 13 and Table 14 report the probit corresponding to the data in Table 5 and Table 
6, respectively. The dependent variable in Table 13, PAT2, equals 1 if the general counsel listed 
patents as the most frequently used IP mechanism to protect foreground knowledge in an RJV 
involving only other firms, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Table 14 PAT3, equals 1 
if the general counsel listed patents as the most frequently used IP mechanism to protect 
foreground knowledge developed in an RJV involving both firms and universities, and 0 
otherwise. When universities are involved, experience in RJVs is the identified determinant. 
Table 13. Determinants of the probability of patents being the most frequently used IPPM to 
protect technology developed in an RJV involving only firms probit estimates: dependent 
variable, PAT2 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.006 (0.361) −0.061 (0.389) 
RJVEXP −0.011 (0.019) – 
ln(RJVEXP) – 0.014 (0.185) 
GENCOUN 1.019 (0.444)** 0.927 (0.457)** 
D38 1.022 (0.641) 1.049 (0.636) 
 Log-likelihood −26.07 −26.25 
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.119 
Chi-square (3d.f.) 0.058 7.11 
N 54 54 





Table 14. Determinants of the probability of patents being the most frequently used IPPM to 
protect technology developed in an RJV involving a university(ies) probit estimates: dependent 
variable, PAT3 
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept −1.613 (0.539)*** −2.153 (0.759)*** 
RJVEXP 0.045 (0.022)** – 
ln(RJVEXP) – 0.609 (0.322)* 
GENCOUN −0.409 (0.688) −0.553 (0.736) 
 Log-likelihood −11.02 −10.99 
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.174 
Chi-square (3 d.f.) 4.58 4.64 
Na 43 43 
a D38 predicted perfectly that patents are the most frequently used IPPM, thus 11 observations 
were dropped. 
* Significant at 0.10 level. 
** Significant at 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at 0.01 level. 
6. Conclusions 
The results in this paper confirm the hypothesis that IP protection is a fundamental consideration 
for all research partnership members. While there is strategic variation among firms regarding 
the way they approach the issue of IPRs, however, the evidence in this paper does not indicate 
that this has been an issue presenting insurmountable problems for large, diversified companies 
with specialised legal resources. If such firms consider it beneficial to engage in research 
cooperatively, IP protection is one of several negotiated problems but typically not the 
‘showstopper’.17 
 
Patents are the IPPM most frequently used by firms to protect both background knowledge and 
foreground knowledge in research partnerships. Exploratory econometric analysis suggests that 
patents do not have a homogeneous effect in IP protection. Rather, the use and presumably 
effectiveness of patents, at least in the context of RJVs, is not independent of the experience of 
the firm with such an organisation form. 
 
In order of general importance, patents are followed by trade secrets, copyrights and trademarks. 
Virtually all firms surveyed and interviewed reported that they routinely rely upon some form of 
IP protection to guard know-how and tacit knowledge carried by their employees, especially in 
the early stages of exploring the possibility of a partnership with other firm(s). Such protection 
may include confidentiality agreements, non-disclosure agreements, or non-compete agreements 
or all of the above. Often overlooked as a form of IP protection, the routine use of such early 
stage agreements is, perhaps, even more effective than patents during the research partnership. 
 
Firms stress the importance of using existing IP titles – especially patents – when negotiating 
entry into new RJVs. The use of existing patents as ‘currency’ seems to be even more important 
for small firms to substitute for a lack of widespread market recognition. The use of patents as 
bargaining chips is in agreement with other recent literature that has substantiated the role of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) as a means of avoiding hold-up problems (Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001). 
 
Prior experience with the same research partners – companies as well as universities – facilitates 
the formation of a new collaborative R&D agreement by reducing red tape and by speeding up 
negotiations on intellectual property issues. IPR negotiations were reported to be more complex 
when other firms in the same industry(ies) are involved in the venture (i.e. horizontal RJVs) as 
well as when universities are involved. With respect to the latter, industry sounded especially 
concerned with the increasing ‘aggressiveness’ and ‘greediness’ of universities in their 
negotiations with firms over IP for expected research outputs from the partnerships, an 
observation stressed by Siegel et al. (2003). 
 
University–industry relationships concerning intellectual property ownership and rights have 
reached a critical point. Negotiations have become very strained and much more difficult to 
resolve in recent years. The major issue is on value and income from IP and on overcoming the 
different perceptions of firms and universities. It also appears that the formation and staffing of 
special offices within universities to handle these negotiations has, from an industry viewpoint, 
created additional tension and difficulty in completing these agreements. 
 
There are bright spots too. A seemingly successful solution has been the development of long-
term, formal strategic partnerships with a few specific universities that cover a multitude of 
situations and provide a flexible and predictable base for cooperation. Moreover, the frequently 
documented tension between academic needs for timely publication of research results and the 
needs of firms for keeping results private did not appear to be an insurmountable problem. The 
interviewed firms have reportedly found ways to work around this. 
 
Views were mixed regarding the extent to which foreign firm involvement in a research 
partnership increased the complexity of IP negotiations. For the most part, European firms were 
considered easier to deal with in collaborative R&D than East Asian partners. Views were also 
mixed regarding the use of ‘boiler plate’ IP protection clauses in contracts for collaborative 
R&D. Several firms reported that prior experience has resulted in the use of standard forms as a 
starting point upon which they can build upon more or less extensively depending on the case 
(e.g. the nature of the technology, of the partner and of the partnership itself). 
 
These results have important implications. One implication is that incentives for cooperative 
R&D are very much affected by the ability of firms to protect their intellectual property. 
Although IP protection was not seen as a showstopper in the case of large, diversified 
companies, the question is still open regarding the extent of its importance to smaller firms in 
negotiating new RJVs. Another implication is that the exclusivity given by analysts from a 
variety of disciplines to patents when studying IP issues in technology-based firms is unjustified. 
Many other IPPMs, especially trade secrets, are being actively employed while negotiating and 
undertaking cooperative research. A third implication is that, in addition to their traditional role 
as mechanisms to protect intellectual property, patents have now become bargaining chips to 
gain entrance into desired partnerships and influence the direction of the cooperative activity. 
 
Important implications relate to university–industry collaboration. To the extent that the reported 
characterisation of aggressiveness and frequent overestimation of the value of university IP for 
short and medium term returns is correct, it may simply reflect temporary adjustment problems 
for universities to an environment significantly different from the one they are used to. It may, 
however, also reflect deeper adjustment problems that have to do with the compatibility of the 
university organisation with collaboration with industry. Nevertheless, several firms reported 
successful solutions to the negotiation problems with universities, hinging on the ability to 
maintain longer term relationships. 
 
Finally, it is fair to say that efforts to create model contracts for cooperative R&D – see, for 
example, the European Framework Programmes – are bound to be successful only to the extent 
that they provide a minimum acceptable standard. While several firms reported that prior 
experience with R&D cooperation has resulted in standard IP protection rules upon which they 
build more or less extensively on a case-by-case basis, no firm reported using ‘boiler plate’ 
contracts for collaborative R&D. This agrees with what appears to be the practice in Europe 
where partners in government funded cooperative R&D ventures tend to sign customised side 
agreements regarding IP protection in addition to the mandated common basis. 
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1 Herein we use the terms research partnership and research joint venture (RJV) interchangeably. 
For a discussion of trends in RJV activity and legislative initiatives to encourage RJV 
formations, see Hagedoorn et al. (2000). 
2 Many RJVs are not registered with the Department of Justice since firms make preliminary 
decisions as to the potential antitrust exposure before filing. 
3 Jaffe's (2000) review emphasises by omission the void of information about patents, much less 
other mechanisms, as a means to protect intellectual property in a collaborative research setting. 
4 See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 US 158, 175 (1964). 
5 See Antitrust Merger Guidelines (1984). The Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 
1976, 15 USC, section 18a, gives the Department of Justice and the FTC the power to review 
major acquisitions before they are consummated. On 1 October 1999, the Department of Justice 
and FTC issued a draft of the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors. 
6 Antitrust Guide Concerning Joint Research Ventures (1980). 
7 The 1999 Guidelines recognise that cooperation and collaboration between competitors often 
are pro-competitive, allowing the firms to expand into foreign markets, fund expensive 
innovation efforts and lower production costs. The Guidelines also recognise that firms 
participating in collaborations, such as joint ventures or strategic alliances, remain potential 
competitors, even if not actual competitors for certain purposes (e.g. R&D) during the 
collaboration. IPRs are considered important in identifying and assessing the relevant market 
affected by the collaboration. 
8 Federal Register filings are being recovered from the CORE and NCRA-RJV databases 
maintained at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro, and The George Washington 
University, respectively. These filings are certainly not the population of all research 
partnerships. Link and Bauer (1989) first demonstrated this fact. Our telephone interviews 
confirm that firms tend only to disclose their collaborative research activities if they expect that 
such activities may be suspect of an antitrust violation. 
9 A probability of response model was estimated with sales and industry dummies as repressors. 
None of the variables entered significantly, however. Thus, no control for response bias is 
included in the econometric models that follow. 
10 IPR protection was reported to be relatively more cumbersome, potentially a ‘showstopper’, 
in horizontal RJVs. 
11 About 10% of the time RJVs involving firms only will not get started because of IP issues, 
and such occurrences mostly involved firms in the same industry. This ‘failure’ rate doubles 
when an university is involved because of lack of expertise in university technology transfer 
offices and lack of negotiating authority by the technology transfer officer. See below for further 
discussion. 
12 Several very large RJVs in the CORE and NCRA-RJV databases seem to be of this kind. 
13 Patents were treated as a general protection mechanism in our survey, although, as Merges 
and Nelson (1994) point out, patents vary in scope and that has consequences for the 
innovativeness of the patenting firm's rivals. It follows then that relative use of patents as an 
IPPM in RJVs could vary with the ability of the firm to capture a greater or lesser scope of 
coverage. 
14 The same argument can be made for copyrights and trademarks since they are also publicly 
registered. Trade secrets can be protected by non-disclosure agreements. 
15 This question was motivated by the preliminary findings of Hall et al. (2001), which found 
this to be the case among participants in ATP-sponsored research partnerships. 
16 University personnel were not interviewed in this study. As a future effort it would be very 
useful to conduct interviews with personnel handling IP matters for universities. 
17 The question remains about smaller firms. While several interviewees implied that patents are 
even more important for small firms in entering RJVs, we do not have extensive direct evidence 
of this. 
